Alex Mysler
What counts as a genocide? Does it matter what we consider genocide if we still recognize the fact that something is an atrocity?
The debate over the breadth or narrowness of the definition of the term “genocide” shows that there is some importance in being able to characterize a series of acts as genocidal. Over the past twenty years, this discussion has been raging in the works of genocide studies scholars in Argentina. These discussions display a broader issue present in the collective memory of Latin Americans when remembering the history of the military dictatorships that governed our countries during the second half of the twentieth century.
I. Argentina, 1976
In the case of Argentina, the State has recognized the prominence of crimes against humanity but not genocide.[1] However, advocates and scholars of genocide studies have pushed back on this viewpoint, considering genocide to be a pivotal concept of Latin American authoritarianism in the second half of the twentieth century.[2] Yet, this interpretation is not aided by the textual definition of genocide in international law.
On March 24, 1976, the Armed Forces of Argentina displaced the government of María Estela Martínez in a period of rampant economic crisis and political violence.[3] This political violence was, in large part, the product of a long-standing battle between left-wing guerrilla groups and the continuous military governments that governed the South American nation after the 1955 coup against Juan Domingo Peron’s government.[4]
Once in power, the so-called “National Reorganization Process” led to a reign of terror within the countries’ borders. Their plan to “reorganize” Argentina consisted of the formation of a clandestine army of members of the Armed Forces, which routinely kidnapped supposed members of terrorist or revolutionary organizations, tortured them in clandestine detention centers, interrogated them, and finally assassinated them.[5] The first three years of the military dictatorship resulted in the disappearance of thousands of people, with the government refusing to disclose their whereabouts, or if they were alive or dead.[6] Such tactics began being used by the military even before the coup, while the country began to descend into crisis.[7] It is estimated that around 30,000 people were disappeared or killed by the Argentine Armed Forces during their regime.[8] The lack of certainty regarding this figure remains due to the clandestine methods of the military government, but declassified documents from 2006 show that the Armed Forces had killed or disappeared around 22,000 people.[9] The Armed Forces would remain in power until 1983.[10]
II. The Historical Development of the concept of “genocide”
So, do these events fit the definition of “genocide” under international law?
The passing of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the Genocide Convention) in 1948 was neither the beginning nor the end of debates on how to define genocide.[11] It is impossible not to begin an examination of the contours of “genocide” as a term anywhere else than Rafael Lemkin’s seminal work “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,” published in 1944. Lemkin sought to craft an appropriate term to encapsulate the horrors of Nazi atrocity.[12] In his work, Lemkin presents the term “genocide” as:
[T]he destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. (…) It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. (…) Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.[13]
From the outset, it is clear that this definition is crafted by mainly looking at the Jewish experience in the Holocaust as the “othered” group within the nation they inhabited. Lemkin’s advocacy for the adoption of genocide in international law was strongly incentivized by the absence of the crime in the sentencing of high-ranking Nazi officials in Nuremberg in October of 1946.[14] The fruits of his advocacy are shown in the passing of General Assembly Resolution 96, passed on December 11, 1946.[15] When enumerating the groups to whom genocide can be committed, the resolution reads:
[G]enocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principles and accomplices — whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds — are punishable.[16]
This initial definition of genocide includes the groups that suffered from persecution during the Holocaust (though the inclusion of sexual orientation, disability, and ethnic groups would have reflected reality more accurately).[17] However, the Genocide Convention passed in 1948 made a curious change. In Article II, the treaty defines genocide as a series of acts aimed at destroying,
[I]n whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.[18]
As can be noticed, “ethnical group” has joined the definition, but “political group” has been left out. This exclusion was not due to a group of forgetful diplomats. The Soviet Union and Great Britain firmly opposed the inclusion of “political groups” in the treaty’s definition.[19] Those who opposed the inclusion of political groups claimed that national laws already protected political groups.[20] However, the actual reasoning behind the exclusion was its potentially subversive nature, which would have likely pushed States away from ratification.[21] Given the binding nature of multilateral treaties, this conception of genocide has persisted more than that of Resolution 96.[22]
The leaders of some Latin American countries at the time supported the exclusion of political groups.[23] Brazil’s ambassador remarked that the oft-occurring revolutions of the continent resulted in “the destruction of political opponents” but then led to times of peace and reconciliation.[24] The comments reflect a morbid reasoning behind the deletion of political groups from the treaty: the idea that the scope of the Convention on genocide was limited by leaders who would be likely to perpetrate that very crime.[25]
III. Where Theory and Application Should Meet
When applying the definition contained in the 1948 Genocide Convention to the context of Latin American dictatorships, the exclusion of political groups and the lack of definition of “national group” makes understanding the systematic persecution and extermination of regime opponents problematic.[26] Many of the groups did not exist “as such” but were instead constructed by the authoritarian regimes themselves.[27] This narrow conception of genocide cannot be applied in many real-world situations in which it would likely be appropriate while also giving perpetrators the benefit of the doubt regarding the nature of their systematic and widespread destruction of national groups.[28] It provides genocidaires with the opportunity to claim that civilian deaths are only the natural and tragic loss of life that comes with any conflict.[29]
In the case of Argentina, Daniel Feierstein (likely the most prominent genocide studies scholar in the country) supports this vision:
Tellingly, the perpetrators left the identity of the persecuted open-ended, even going so far as to say in one particularly sinister statement that “subversive criminal” could mean “the rebels, accomplices, supporters, the indifferent and timid.”[30]
Carlos Alberto Rozanski expands on how oppressors in Argentina would not fit the traditional definition of genocide. The ability of the Military Junta to craft a political group that simultaneously did not necessarily have a common characteristic other than their (possibly perceived) opposition to the dictatorship or their (possibly perceived) affiliation with opponents of the regime. As the leader of the First Military Junta, Jorge Rafael Videla, said in 1976:
[W]e consider that it is a grave crime to attack the Western and Christian style of life, wanting to change it for one that is strange to us. And in this type of fight, we do not only consider that the aggressor acts through a bomb, a shot, or kidnapping but also those in the field of ideas that want to change our way of life through ideas that are obviously subversive, which means they subvert values, change and upset values.[31]
The target of the genocide, the “subversive,” is nothing more than an amalgamation of non-authoritarian political ideologies and closeness to those ideologies. And yet, regardless of the inapplicability of the definition within the Genocide Convention, it would be hard to see the devastation and horror wrought by the regime and claim it does not bear a striking resemblance to the “coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” that Lemkin wrote about in 1944.[32]
IV. Memory, Truth, and Justice
The insistence on calling the dictatorial governments of Latin America genocidal comes from a desire to tell the whole truth and not just a part of it. The broad, complex, and severe nature of the intentional and systematic destruction of a national group can only be described by the term genocide.[33] Such experiences are commonplace in the continent, with Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala standing out as the prime examples.[34]
Simultaneously, taking a strong stance regarding the systematic extermination of Argentinians is crucial in an era of increasing denialism. The start of the 2020s has brought with it the reemergence of far-right groups that either minimize or deny the existence of any crimes committed by the military government.[35] This goes beyond denying the existence of genocide. For denialist movements, that issue was never in question. But President Javier Milei said in November of 2023, before winning the presidential election, that there were no 30.000 victims, only a war where excesses were committed.[36] As human rights organizations and political movements across the spectrum marched in remembrance of the victims of the dictatorship on March 24, 2025, Milei and his government railed against supposed inflated victim counts while defunding institutions that analyzed documents produced by the Armed Forces during the 70s and 80s.[37]
To call Latin American dictatorships genocidal is an exercise in genuinely examining our history honestly and accurately. It is crucial to use “genocide” as a term that transcends the traditional and restrictive manner in which States purposely attempted to curtail the concept. It is especially necessary in an era where victims are the target of erasure and when our history risks being rewritten by the cynical champions of terror. Memory is necessary in such moments, and it will most certainly be present in 2026 when Argentinians march in remembrance of the 50th anniversary of the 1976 coup.
[1] See generally, Dirección General de Derechos Humanos, El derecho a la memoria, verdad y justicia por los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Dictámenes del Ministerio Público Fiscal ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (2012 – 2018) (2018).
[2] Mariano Nagy, Genocidio: derrotero e historia de un concepto y sus discusiones, 27.2 Memoria Americana, Cuadernos de Etnohistoria 10, 25 (Nov. 2019).
[3] Marcos Novaro, Historia de la Argentina 1955-2020 146 (2nd ed. 2021).
[4] Id. at 142–143.
[5] Id. at 150–151.
[6] Id. at 152.
[7] Id. at 151.
[8] Ludmila Da Silva Catela, Son 30.000, Instituto de Antropología de Córdoba (Mar. 22, 2024), https://idacor.conicet.gov.ar/son-30mil/.
[9] Id.
[10] Novaro, supra note 3, at 195–96.
[11] Nagy, supra note 2, at 11.
[12] Id. at 15.
[13] Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress 79 (1944).
[14] Nagy, supra note 2, at 17–18.
[15] G.A. Res. 96(I) (Dec. 11, 1946).
[16] Id. at 189.
[17] Nazi Persecution of other groups: 1933 ‑ 1945, Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, https://hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/nazi-persecution/, (last visited Mar. 31, 2025).
[18] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9 1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
[19] Nagy, supra note 2, at 21; Jeffrey S. Bachman, The Politics of Genocide: From the Genocide Convention to the Responsibility to Protect 44 (2022).
[20] Fanny Martin, The Notion of ‘Protected Group’ in the Genocide Convention and Its Application, in The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary 112, 116 (Paola Gaeta, ed., 2009).
[21] Id. at 117.
[22] Hard Law/soft law, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (last visited Mar. 31, 2025), https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/hard-law-soft-law/.
[23] Bachman, supra note 19, at 45.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Nagy, supra note 2, at 23.
[27] Marcelo Ferreira, El Genocidio y Su Caracterización Como “Eliminación Parcial de Grupo Nacional”, Año II N°8 Revista de Derecho Penal y Criminología (2012).
[28] Nagy, supra note 2, at 25.
[29] Bachman, supra note 19, at 47.
[30] Daniel Eduardo Feierstein, Terror and Identity: The Case of Argentina and the Importance of the Different ‘Representations’ of the Past, in Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Genocide and Memory 65, 74 (Jutta Lindert & Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2018).
[31] Carlos Alberto Rozanski, ¿Para qué juzgar?, in La Shoá, los genocidios y crímenes de lesa humanidad: Enseñanzas para los juristas 50, 51–52 (Secretaría de Derechos Humanos ed. 2011).
[32] Lemkin, supra note 13, at 79.
[33] Rozanski supra note 31, at 56.
[34] Daniel Eduardo Feierstein, Genocidios constituyentes y reorganizadores en la historia latinoamericana, in La Shoá, los genocidios y crímenes de lesa humanidad: Enseñanzas para los juristas 86, 91 (Secretaría de Derechos Humanos ed. 2011).
[35] Luciana Bertoia, La Peligrosa Avanzada del Negacionismo, Pagina 12 (May 26, 2022), https://www.pagina12.com.ar/424323-la-peligrosa-avanzada-del-negacionismo.
[36] Facundo Iglesia, ‘Justification of Dictatorship’: Outcry as Milei Rewrites Argentina’s History, The Guardian (Mar. 23, 2024), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/javier-milei-argentina-dictatorship-remembrance.
[37] Javier Lorca, El Gobierno de Milei Profundiza su Discurso Negacionista Del Terrorismo de Estado en Argentina, El País (Mar. 24, 2025), https://elpais.com/argentina/2025-03-24/el-gobierno-de-milei-profundiza-su-discurso-negacionista-del-terrorismo-de-estado-en-argentina.html; Federico Rivas Molina & Mar Centenera, Decenas de Miles de Argentinos Marchan Contra el Negacionismo de la Dictadura que Promueve Milei, El País (Mar. 24, 2025), https://elpais.com/argentina/2025-03-24/decenas-de-miles-de-argentinos-marchan-contra-el-negacionismo-de-la-dictadura-que-promueve-milei.html.