William Priess
The current negotiations between Iran and the U.S. highlight the near impossibility of open and honest negotiation with an unreliable state. Currently, the Trump administration is in talks with the Iranian government to end their nuclear weapons program (“Program”), or failing that, is expected to launch a strike to further destroy the Iranian ability to develop nuclear weapons.[1] However, this latest set of negotiations is not the first time that the world at large has negotiated with Iran to curb their Program.
In 1968 Iran signed onto the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, agreeing to not develop nuclear weapons in the future. However, after the 1979 revolution deposing the Shah, the country started developing them in secret, violating its original commitment.[2] From this period forward, Iran continued to develop nuclear weapons in secret, focusing on developing uranium enrichment facilities and the computer modeling necessary to build a nuclear bomb.[3] After these Programs were ultimately discovered in 2003 the EU negotiated with Iran to end its Program, with Iran ultimately signing a new agreement with additional protocols to “safeguard the agreement.”[4] After signing this new agreement, Iran continued to develop its Programs in secret once again.[5] In 2006 a multinational group called P5+1 was developed, leading to new negotiations with Iran, backed by the UN, to stop their Programs. These negotiations culminated in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA).[6] The JPOA listed the steps and limitations that Iran would need to follow, such as stopping the enrichment of uranium and allowing increased monitoring by international organizations, and provided that in return Iran would gain some relief from the already imposed sanctions.[7] During the Trump administration’s first term the U.S. backed out of the deal citing a lack of transparency around Iran’s past nuclear developments, and a failure to halt the country’s missile programs.[8] After the U.S. backed out of the deal, and the killing of Soleimani, Iran abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) limits on enriching uranium.[9] Later, when the Biden administration entered office in 2021, the U.S. pledged to rejoin the deal, leading to renewed negotiations. During the negotiations, Iran demanded that an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) probe into enriched uranium at undeclared sites be halted.[10] This negotiation ended in failure with no final agreement and Iran continuing, and accelerating, its Program.[11]
The point of outlining the history of the various unsuccessful deals intended to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapons development is to demonstrate the ultimate futility in negotiating with states that have no shared interest in cooperating with the world order. States that have already weathered the storm of sanctions and have come out on the other side alive have little incentive to adhere to further treaties or agreements that constrain their ability to pursue their actual goals with a “carrot” that they do not care for.[12] If Iran’s government believed that being sanction-free was worth curtailing their nuclear agreement, then they would have had ample opportunity to make amends with the world at large and stop. But as evidenced by over four decades of doing the exact opposite, they do not.
Thus, the question of if carrots—treaties, agreements, and their economic advantages—have no effect then what is left to do but bring out the stick? For state actors whose goals do align with the narrow band of increased economic development or the freedom of their peoples, appealing to an agreement they enter into is seemingly illusory. This brings into question the ability of the Rules Based World Orders’s ability to actually influence non-cooperative states. If a state is not interested in playing within the rules of the game, what resources do organizations like the UN have? When any such deal is not actually a bargain for said state to end its actions, but rather an opportunity for them to continue in secret for a while, and then to try to bargain for more in the next round of negotiations, what is the actual point of trying to renegotiate when it is obvious that that this deal is as illusory as the last? It is merely a delay of the inevitable, showing that mere words do not suffice, and action must be taken. However, what that action is, and who should do it, is still an open question.
In this particular case the U.S. has stepped up to the plate to try and enact change in Iran through force, beginning by destroying some of Iran’s ability to further develop nuclear weapons.[13] But it is still yet to be seen if further intervention will happen to bring to an end the horrific abuse of the Iranian people, and to end the Iranian Program once and for all.
[1] Alexander Ward et al., Trump Approaches Legacy-Defining Moment on Iran: A Deal or War, Wall St. J., (Feb. 20, 2026) https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-approaches-legacy-defining-moment-on-iran-a-deal-or-war-ae3fe857.
[2] A History of Iran’s Nuclear Program, IRAN WATCH (Dec. 19, 2023) https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) Archive and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Archive, U.S. Dep’t of the treasury (Oct. 18, 2015) https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions/joint-plan-of-action-jpoa-archive-and-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-jcpoa-archive
[7] Id.
[8] White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal (May, 8, 2018) https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/
[9] Laurel Wamsley & Emily Kwong, Iran Abandons Nuclear Deal Limitations In Wake Of Soleimani Killing, NPR (Jan. 5 2020) https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793814276/iran-abandons-nuclear-deal-limitations-in-wake-of-soleimani-killing
[10] A History of Iran’s Nuclear Program, Iran Watch (Dec. 19, 2023) https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program.
[11] Sina Toossi, Biden had a chance to undo Trump’s mistakes. He dropped the ball., Responsible Statecraft (May 8, 2024) https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-nuclear-deal-2668189539/
[12] See also CFR Editors, opinion, Three Years of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?, Couns. on Foreign Rels. (Oct. 23, 2025) https://www.cfr.org/articles/three-years-war-ukraine-are-sanctions-against-russia-making-difference (explaining the effectiveness of sanction against Russian in the Russia–Ukraine war).
[13] Thomas Mackintosh & Nadine Yousif, What we know about US strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites, BBC, (June 23, 2025) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9r4q99g4o.